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 -    -  2ABSTRACT 
 
This paper follows Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988) and Beatty (1989), who find 
lower underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs) when prestigious auditors are used to 
attest to the IPO's financial statements. Australian IPOs are not obliged to nominate audit 
firms in the prospectus but often identify that they will have audit committees so as to 
assist in more appropriate corporate governance. This paper analyses if IPOs identifying 
the existence of audit committees in the prospectus have a lower underpricing 
return. While our findings are consistent with previous studies concluding that both the 
size of the new issue and the use of an underwriter are important ingredients in the level 
of underpricing return, the inclusion of an audit committee in the prospectuses has 
actually increased underpricing returns. The capital market may view the audit committee 











 -    -  31. Introduction 
 
There are numerous studies into initial public offerings (IPOs) documenting the 
phenomenon of “underpricing”. Underpricing refers to the issue price of the shares of a 
new publicly listed company being lower than the trading price of those shares on the 
first day of lisiting. The underpricing literature has consistently found significant initial 
day returns to investors who subscribed for shares in IPOs. Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist (1994) identify a range of international evidence. 
 
For the six year period 1994 to 1999, equity capital of over AUD 24.4 billion was raised 
by 358 IPO companies listing on the Australian Stock Exchange. The mean underpricing 
return for this sample of IPOs was 25.6%.  This translates to the subscribers to the IPOs 
making a 25.6% first day return if they had bought an equivalent amount of every IPO 
during this period and had sold at the closing price of the first day’s trading. It is also 
interesting to note that these initial public offerings (IPOs) had an aggregate market 
capitalisaton of around AUD 30.1 billion at the end of the first day. This translates to the 
former owners of the IPOs leaving around AUD 5.7 billion of what is commonly referred 
to as “money on the table” for the subscribers. 
 
It was Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) famous study that argued that lower ex ante uncertainty 
about the value of an IPO reduces the “need” for underpricing. Since then, researchers 
have been seeking to find variables that help explain this uncertainty. Ibbotson, Sindelar 
and Ritter (1994) and Michaelly and Shaw (1994) found a negative relationship between 
underpricing and the amount of the capital raising of an IPO. Balvers, McDonald and 
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the quality of the certification and the lower the underpricing of the IPO. James and Weir 
(1990) find that even the existence of a borrowing relationship with a banker reduces the 
uncertainty and hence lowers the underpricing return.  
 
This study is motivated by the Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988) and Beatty (1989) 
findings. Australian IPOs are not obliged to nominate audit firms in the prospectus but 
often identify that they will have audit committees so as to assist in more appropriate 
corporate governance. This paper analyses if IPOs identifying the existence of audit 
committees in the prospectus have a lower underpricing return.   
 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we briefly summarise the general role of 
audit committees then review some of the literature on auditors and the underpricing of 
IPOs. Section 3 presents the regression model. Section 4 reports our empirical results. In 
Section 5 we make some concluding remarks. 
 
2.   Audit Committees, Auditors and Underpricing. 
 
 
In this section we briefly discuss the general role of audit committees and then identify 
some literature regarding auditors and the underpricing of IPOs. While the Board of 
Directors is responsible for the strategy and strategic direction of the company, the 
Audit Committee responsibilities would generally include nominating external auditors 
and reviewing the terms of their engagement; overviewing the effectiveness of internal 
and external audit procedures; ensuring accurate and reliable financial information is 
 -    -  5provided to shareholders and statutory authorities in a timely manner and providing 
external auditors with access to the Board. Essentially, the Audit Committee is a 
committee of the Board designed to provide additional assurance regarding the quality 
and reliability of financial data and financial statements relied on by the Board and 
issued by the Board to the shareholders. 
 
Three major studies regarding auditors and the underpricing of IPOs are reported in the 
literature. Firstly, Titman and Trueman (1986) argue that the more costly that the auditor, 
the higher the quality of the certification and hence the lower the uncertainty about the 
IPOs value and the lower the underpricing.  Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988) and 
later, Beatty (1989) argue that underpricing was lower when prestigious auditors (defined 
as one of the then big 8 accounting and audit firms) were used in the IPO.  
 
A later study by Michaelly and Shaw (1995) confirms that IPOs associated with more 
prestigious auditors are less risky because such auditors seek to protect their reputational 
capital. They argue that good firms are willing to pay the higher fees charged by the then 
big 8 firms.  
  
3. Data and Methods 
 
The data consists of 358 Australian industrial and resource IPOs that sought equity 
capital from January 1994 to December 1999. Only those companies that raised sufficient 
public equity capital to list on the Australian Stock Exchange were included. Property 
and equity trust IPOs were excluded (consistent with How and Low (1993)), as were 
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data was from the Connect 4 Company Prospectuses database.   
 
This study includes variables from previous studies that have been found to be 
statistically significant in explaining the level of underpricing and hence likely to 
influence the underpricing return. The audit committee variable is chosen to see if it is 
relevant to underpricing returns. The variables to be tested are defined as follows: 
 
•    the  total  capital  sought  (LNTOTAL) [Michaely and Shaw (1994), Ibbotson, 
Sindelar and Ritter (1994)];  
•  the underwritten (UWRITTEN) variable is a (0 or 1) dummy variable reflecting 
no underwriter (0) or an underwriter (1) was used in the IPO [Dimovski and 
Brooks (forthcoming) and adapted from the underwriter reputation variables in 
Carter and Manaster (1990), Michaelly and Shaw (1995);];  
•    the audit committee (AUDTCTEE) variable is a (0 or 1) dummy variable 
reflecting no audit committee (0) or an audit committee (1) was used in the IPO  
[adapted from Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988) and Beatty (1989)] 
 
 
An ordinary least squares regression model is performed on the data. The dependent 
variable, underpricing return (RETURN) is the difference in the closing price of the 
shares (plus the options if any (How and Howe (2001)) on the first day of listing less the 
public issue price, divided by the public issue price. The closing prices were obtained 
from the IRESS database. 
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The regression model with underpricing return on the table as the dependent variable is: 
 
RETURN =  β0  +  β1 LNTOTAL  +  β2 UWRITTEN  +  β3 AUDTCTEE  +  ε         (1) 
 
where all the variables are as defined previously, the β’s are unknown parameters to be 
estimated and ε is assumed ~ N (0, σ²). 
 
The first variable (LNTOTAL) has been found to be significant in previous empirical 
underpricing studies and is expected to relate to the underpricing return. The 
UWRITTEN variable reflects whether the issue is underwritten or it is not.  From 
Dimovski and Brooks (forthcoming) it is expected that underwriters involved in the issue 
(as opposed to an issue not being underwritten) may allow a higher underpricing return.  
 
  The AUDTCTEE variable tests the hypothesis that the identification of an audit 
committee in the prospectus, the higher the standard of corporate governance in the firm 
and the lower the uncertainty about the new issue and hence the lower the underpricing. 





Table 1 reports the multiple ordinary least squares regression results between the 
underpricing return and the selected explanatory variables for the overall six year period. 
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categorisations. To account for some individual observations that may be exerting undue 
influence on the partial coefficients, any observations whose underpricing returns are 
over 3.5 standard deviations from the mean return are excluded from the model and 
modified regression results reported. The identification of outliers over 3.5 standard 
deviations is consistent with How (2000). A range of standard regression diagnostics 
were calculated for the models applied to the data. In testing for non-normal errors, a 
Jarque-Bera statistic is applied to the data. In testing for heteroscedasticity, a White test is 
applied and White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent coefficients and p-values are 
reported. In testing for omitted variables or model misspecification, a Ramsey Reset test 
is applied and reported. 
 
For the overall six year period and for the industrials categorisation, the results of the 
regression analysis suggest that the LNTOTAL variable has explanatory power in regard 
to the amount of underpricing return of IPOs. When the outliers are removed, all three 
variables have some explanatory power in regard to the amount of underpricing return of 
IPOs in the overall six year model and in the partitioned data of Industrial IPOs. The 





The overall six year (excluding outliers) and industrials (excluding outliers) models are 
useful. Our findings are consistent with previous studies concluding that both the size of 
the new issue and the use of an underwiter are important ingredients in the level of 
 -    -  9underpricing return. Interestingly, however, the inclusion of an audit committee in the 
prospectuses of IPOs appears to actually increase underpricing returns. Perhaps the 
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This table reports on the results for underpricing across a number of regression model specifications. The 
specifications include all of the data, the data categorised by industry characteristics and the data 
excluding outliers. 
The table reports OLS parameter estimates (Coef.) and p-values (Pr.) as well standard regression 
diagnostics. White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent coefficients and p-values are reported where HCC 
is identified. 
Categorization/ 
No. of IPOs 
C LNTOTAL  UWRITTEN  AUDTCTEE Adjusted
R-sq 
  Jarque-Bera White  test Reset  test
1994-99 
  
Coef. 1.019 -0.055 0.120 0.086 0.014 15478.930 7.329 5.548
IPOs 358    Pr. 0.006 0.017  0.143 0.221 0.000 0.119 0.021
1994-99  
No outliers 
Coef. 0.544 -0.029 0.115 0.101 0.026 643.286 6.901 5.548
IPOs 353   Pr. 0.021 0.046 0.026 0.023 0.000 0.142 0.064
     
RESOURCES 
 
Coef. 0.858 -0.053 0.239 -0.129 -0.011 4525.034 2.412 5.336
IPOs 96  
 
Pr. 0.480 0.493 0.302 0.640 0.000 0.660 0.198
RESOURCES 
No outliers 
Coef. 0.043 -0.001 0.109 -0.068 -0.007 447.753 2.871 21.633
IPOs 94 
 
Pr. 0.923 0.966 0.193 0.493 0.000 0.580 0.172
     
INDUSTRIALS 
 
Coef. 1.120 -0.058 0.089 0.098 0.024 2722.974 8.401 5.744
IPOs 262 HCC 
 
Pr. 0.014 0.024  0.292 0.186 0.000 0.078 0.001
INDUSTRIALS 
No outliers 
Coef. 0.775 -0.041 0.125 0.089 0.033 341.172 5.292 5.471
IPOs 259  
 
Pr. 0.006 0.015 0.045 0.083 0.000 0.259 0.018
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